From The News Journal (delawareonline.com):
Judge said du Pont heir 'will not fare well' in prison
So a wealthy du Pont heir convicted of raping his 3-year-old daughter is getting probation and 'treatment' instead of time behind bars because he "will not fare well" in prison (as if anybody fucking does). Reminds me of Glenn Greenwald's article, "HSBC, too big to jail, is the new poster child for US two-tiered justice system," in which he concludes: "How this glaringly disparate, and explicitly status-based, treatment under the criminal law does not produce serious social unrest is mystifying."
I couldn't agree more with Greenwald. I've been ranting about and protesting against this kind of shit ever since I started to actually pay attention to the world around me; and for the life of me, I can't understand why more people aren't up in arms over shit like this, or endless other examples of a glaringly inegalitarian system that not only produces toxic accumulations of both wealth and power, but serves to protect the economic, legal, and political hegemony of capital and wealthy/ruling-class elites while ruthlessly taking its pound of flesh from the rest of society, particularly from the backs of minorities and the poor.
If this or the Greenwald article doesn't piss you off and start to make you question whether we can do better, it really should.
Monday, March 31, 2014
Saturday, March 29, 2014
the downside of gentrification
Gentrification has a dark side and it's something I think we need to start talking about it, as well as having a broader conversation about the way our political-economic system is organized.
A lot of people I've talked to about gentrification seem to be for it primarily based on the positives of urban renewal projects, such as the influx of business it brings and how it helps to revitalize neighborhoods that've seen better days. What often happens, though, is that many of the people who already live in those areas get displaced.
Poorer yet up-and-coming areas of the city targeted for gentrification essentially get makeovers by the city, with improvements to public transit, good grocery outlets, etc. that tend to attract young, middle-class families and upwordly mobile individuals from other areas of the city, particularly the suburbs. Developers also play a role, buying properties to flip or convert into more profitable enterprises. It seems like a good thing. New things are being built and new people are moving in. Win-win, right?
A big problem, however, is that this influx of people, in combination with all the trendy, new (and pricier) dining and shopping establishments and living spaces that pop up, starts to put pressure on surrounding rents, real estate prices, and low-income communities, forcing many of the poorer, long-term residents to move to elsewhere, which often ends up by necessity being poorer neighborhoods on the outskirts of the neighborhood or city in question that lack many of the basic services of the one they're forced to leave.
Portland, one of the fastest gentrifying cities in the US, has seen its fair share of this, from gentrification in the 80s and 90s pushing out long-time working-class and African-American residents into the north and northeast to where it's currently threatening to push out homeless encampments and shelters downtown, and lower-income residents all over Portland outside of city limits.
One of the major issues this story raises, in my opinion, is the way the state (like many others) actually forbids things like rent controls while at the same time allowing property owners to rent based on income caps, highlighting the unequal relations between renters and property owners. As Commissioner Fritz so blatantly puts it, the state values land ownership rights over tenants' rights; and this hurts people. People like my friend Joe are being displaced, with little-to-no compensation; they're losing their homes and access to their communities as a result. And that's just the tip of the iceberg.
Renters essentially have no rights nor recourse within the current system based on profit and property rights. They're at the whim of markets, often unsympathetic legislators and courts, and property owners and developers who are conditioned and/or coerced by competitive pressures to make decisions based on profit rather than the needs of tenants or the surrounding community.
And worst of all, many in their own community are conditioned by the same system to to shrug off their suffering and say, "Tough luck, you should just stop being a loser and make more money or else move."
A lot of people I've talked to about gentrification seem to be for it primarily based on the positives of urban renewal projects, such as the influx of business it brings and how it helps to revitalize neighborhoods that've seen better days. What often happens, though, is that many of the people who already live in those areas get displaced.
Poorer yet up-and-coming areas of the city targeted for gentrification essentially get makeovers by the city, with improvements to public transit, good grocery outlets, etc. that tend to attract young, middle-class families and upwordly mobile individuals from other areas of the city, particularly the suburbs. Developers also play a role, buying properties to flip or convert into more profitable enterprises. It seems like a good thing. New things are being built and new people are moving in. Win-win, right?
A big problem, however, is that this influx of people, in combination with all the trendy, new (and pricier) dining and shopping establishments and living spaces that pop up, starts to put pressure on surrounding rents, real estate prices, and low-income communities, forcing many of the poorer, long-term residents to move to elsewhere, which often ends up by necessity being poorer neighborhoods on the outskirts of the neighborhood or city in question that lack many of the basic services of the one they're forced to leave.
Portland, one of the fastest gentrifying cities in the US, has seen its fair share of this, from gentrification in the 80s and 90s pushing out long-time working-class and African-American residents into the north and northeast to where it's currently threatening to push out homeless encampments and shelters downtown, and lower-income residents all over Portland outside of city limits.
One of the major issues this story raises, in my opinion, is the way the state (like many others) actually forbids things like rent controls while at the same time allowing property owners to rent based on income caps, highlighting the unequal relations between renters and property owners. As Commissioner Fritz so blatantly puts it, the state values land ownership rights over tenants' rights; and this hurts people. People like my friend Joe are being displaced, with little-to-no compensation; they're losing their homes and access to their communities as a result. And that's just the tip of the iceberg.
Renters essentially have no rights nor recourse within the current system based on profit and property rights. They're at the whim of markets, often unsympathetic legislators and courts, and property owners and developers who are conditioned and/or coerced by competitive pressures to make decisions based on profit rather than the needs of tenants or the surrounding community.
And worst of all, many in their own community are conditioned by the same system to to shrug off their suffering and say, "Tough luck, you should just stop being a loser and make more money or else move."
Friday, March 14, 2014
sick-day rant
Ironically, I hate not working because it gives me too much time to think abut all the things I hate about working. I hate, for example, that I'm pressured to work for a wage to survive, trading my autonomy (and sometimes my dignity) for a portion of the value I help produce but have no rights to. I hate the control over my life that employers generally have and freely exert, from when I have to be there and when I can leave to when I can even fucking pee. I hate that I have to schedule my entire life around when I'm not working, time which is also dictated by employers. I hate how difficult it is to find a job you like with an employer who doesn't treat you like a commodity (or like shit, since your labour-power is nothing but a commodity in the final analysis), where you're not belittled every day by management simply because you're on the low end of the capitalist totem pole. I hate how employers have the tendency to make you feel like an asshole when you're not able to make it in to work, even if you rarely ever call in. I hate the alienation of work, from the alienation imposed by the social relations of production (e.g., the divide between owners/managers and workers due to unequal relations, the divide between workers due to competition for and at work, etc.) to the alienation of not owning the product of my labours and the unfulfillingness of working simply to produce surplus-value for another. I hate that I'm pressured to spend so much time doing something I often don't enjoy for people who often don't know or care about me, while I spend so little with the people I love and who love me. I hate the stress this causes. And most of all, I hate that so many other people feel the same way, even if they're not fully cognizant of it, but at the same time feel trapped materially by their dependency on wages and psychologically by cultural and ideological conditioning into believing there's no alternative. /rant
Saturday, March 8, 2014
happy international women's day
Today marks the 103rd anniversary of International Women's Day, a day dedicated to women and their contributions to the world.
At the beginning of the 20th century, when the first International Women's Day was observed, women were being pushed into the workforce in record numbers due to a combination of factors including rapid economic and population growth, widespread poverty, and the need for cheap labour to fuel the industrial capitalist machine.
Women, who in many countries, including the US, still couldn't vote, were often working 10-12 hours a day in deplorable, sweatshop-style conditions, sometimes even being locked in factories until their work was done. And during this time, many of the largest and most militant strikes were organized by women fighting for things like shorter hours, better pay, safer working conditions, the right to unionize, and the right to vote.
With all the progress that's been made, it can be easy to forget how bad things were and how far we've come in just the last 100 years alone. But I think it's important to remind ourselves every now and then of the contributions and struggles of working women in both the past and present, not only to honour those that fought so hard to get us where we are today, but to remind ourselves of the work that's yet to be done.
So today, we celebrate and honour the contributions and struggles of women everywhere. Bread and Roses!
At the beginning of the 20th century, when the first International Women's Day was observed, women were being pushed into the workforce in record numbers due to a combination of factors including rapid economic and population growth, widespread poverty, and the need for cheap labour to fuel the industrial capitalist machine.
Women, who in many countries, including the US, still couldn't vote, were often working 10-12 hours a day in deplorable, sweatshop-style conditions, sometimes even being locked in factories until their work was done. And during this time, many of the largest and most militant strikes were organized by women fighting for things like shorter hours, better pay, safer working conditions, the right to unionize, and the right to vote.
With all the progress that's been made, it can be easy to forget how bad things were and how far we've come in just the last 100 years alone. But I think it's important to remind ourselves every now and then of the contributions and struggles of working women in both the past and present, not only to honour those that fought so hard to get us where we are today, but to remind ourselves of the work that's yet to be done.
So today, we celebrate and honour the contributions and struggles of women everywhere. Bread and Roses!
Tuesday, March 4, 2014
ukraine, a mirror of capitalist social relations?
Ukraine is being torn apart and it seems like there's plenty of blame to go around. Some blame Russia and pro-Russian Ukrainians. Some blame the West and pro-EU Ukrainians. Some blame the oligarchs. Some blame the fascists, who fall on both sides, although primarily on the pro-West side. Some say that Ukraine is the just the latest victim of US/Russian imperialism and the new Cold War.
On the face of it, I think they're all right, each side ultimately adding to the political instability. But on a deeper, more abstract level, I think the seeds of this crisis are the competitive social relations inherent in, and which dominate, 'exploitative' modes of production such as capitalism (and feudalism before that)—the former being the material basis for the continued social reproduction of the latter.
Unlike those who assume 'human nature' is a fixed, static thing that's naturally greedy, competitive, etc., I take the position that much of what we label human nature is fluid and changeable yet strongly conditioned by the world around us, including the economic 'base' of society, the way society reproduces itself. Hence the forces and social relations that are embodied within any given mode of production help shape and influence the ideas and social relations within that society (and in a global context, that includes those between nation-states). In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, for example, Marx famously writes:
In a capitalist system, what Marx termed the 'coercive laws of competition' forces individual capitals to compete with one another and exploit labour as much as they can in the pursuit of profit; and at the same time, these coercive laws of competition force individual workers to compete with fellow workers, locally as well as globally, for jobs that provide the wages they depend on to survive. And this, in turn, influences and reinforces relations (individual, national, etc.) that are built upon or grow out of this socio-economic foundation.
Ukraine, then, can be seen as an extreme example and reflection of this competition, particularly between nation-states and especially the EU (and the US) and Russia. In the final analysis, most global conflicts have material, socio-economic causes underlying them, not ideological ones. Imperialism is really just the coercive laws of competition unfolding at the political level via the expansion and protection of markets and spheres of influence; and Ukraine is currently in the middle of an imperialist tug-of-war between national competitors that's tearing the country apart from the inside out.
Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions to these things, and god knows how it's going to turn out in the end. But regardless of the outcome, I can't help but wonder what a world characterized by a mode of production based on cooperation and free association (rather than competition and unequal social relations) might look like and how it might change things. Just imagine the possibilities.
On the face of it, I think they're all right, each side ultimately adding to the political instability. But on a deeper, more abstract level, I think the seeds of this crisis are the competitive social relations inherent in, and which dominate, 'exploitative' modes of production such as capitalism (and feudalism before that)—the former being the material basis for the continued social reproduction of the latter.
Unlike those who assume 'human nature' is a fixed, static thing that's naturally greedy, competitive, etc., I take the position that much of what we label human nature is fluid and changeable yet strongly conditioned by the world around us, including the economic 'base' of society, the way society reproduces itself. Hence the forces and social relations that are embodied within any given mode of production help shape and influence the ideas and social relations within that society (and in a global context, that includes those between nation-states). In A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy, for example, Marx famously writes:
In the social production of their existence, men inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of men that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness.
In a capitalist system, what Marx termed the 'coercive laws of competition' forces individual capitals to compete with one another and exploit labour as much as they can in the pursuit of profit; and at the same time, these coercive laws of competition force individual workers to compete with fellow workers, locally as well as globally, for jobs that provide the wages they depend on to survive. And this, in turn, influences and reinforces relations (individual, national, etc.) that are built upon or grow out of this socio-economic foundation.
Ukraine, then, can be seen as an extreme example and reflection of this competition, particularly between nation-states and especially the EU (and the US) and Russia. In the final analysis, most global conflicts have material, socio-economic causes underlying them, not ideological ones. Imperialism is really just the coercive laws of competition unfolding at the political level via the expansion and protection of markets and spheres of influence; and Ukraine is currently in the middle of an imperialist tug-of-war between national competitors that's tearing the country apart from the inside out.
Unfortunately, there are no simple solutions to these things, and god knows how it's going to turn out in the end. But regardless of the outcome, I can't help but wonder what a world characterized by a mode of production based on cooperation and free association (rather than competition and unequal social relations) might look like and how it might change things. Just imagine the possibilities.
Friday, February 28, 2014
laissez-faire capitalism = the short road to socialism?
One place where I fundamentally disagree with most free-market advocates and laissez-faire economists is the assumption that state intervention is bad/obstructive from the point of view of capitalism proper. "Oh no, inflation! Taxes! Deficits! Devalued currency!" But while state intervention can lead to inflation, higher taxes, budget deficits, and a rapidly expanding, devalued money supply, from the standpoint of labour theory, state intervention, particularly on the part of Washington due to the dollar's role as global reserve currency, is not only 'good,' but needed to keep capitalism from experiencing a falling rate of profit-induced depression.
As the blogger Jehu argues (correctly, in my opinion) via Twitter, "Fascist state deficit spending is drawn from the mass of superfluous capital loaned to it from both within the US and abroad [here fascism = the assumption by the state of the functions of the capitalist class]. Most of the discussion concerning this deficit spending focuses on the ability of the US to fund its deficits, but this is not the problem. So long as the excess capital accumulates within the world market, this capital must find its way into US treasuries. The alternative is that it sits idle and will sooner or later suffer massive nominal devaluation. This excess capital cannot be employed as capital and would, in the absence of Washington's debts, simply fall out of circulation. In such a case there would be a crisis of overaccumulation along the lines described by Marx in Capital, Volume 3, chapter 15."
In other words, the state intervenes because it must, not because of any ideological considerations. The latter may influence or shape said intervention, but it's not the primary cause of it—the contradictions inherent within the capitalist mode of production are. Otherwise, "Side by side with the mass of excess capital, there would also appear a massive population of unemployed workers, who are utterly cut off from productive employment. Assuming the more conservative figures of unproductive labor time provided by Borsch-Supan are correct, this amounts to anywhere from 10% to 30% of the working class. Using the most conservative numbers offered by labor theorists, unemployment could easily reach 50%."
Socially, this level of unemployment would lead to a situation similar to that of the Great Depression worldwide, with all the social unrest and subsequent labour militancy. But as Jehu argues, this unemployment is only the tip of the 'cliche iceberg': "Absent US deficits, overaccumulation would produce a classical depression of the falling rate of profit. Fifty percent of nominal economic activity would evaporate; in turn, competition would erupt among capital to avoid losses; the financial sector would implode; prices would collapse; industrial activity would halt; and the credit system would shut down. The effects would not simply be limited to the US, but would spread throughout the world market; in first place because the depression would severely restrict US imports from the rest of the world market. The largest trading partners of the US would suffer knock-on effects of the collapse of US demands for their output. Moreover, since the crisis in the US forcibly devalues commodity prices there, these commodities will become competitive against former US competitors, adding the deflationary pressures in those countries."
He concludes that, "With the fall off in US trade deficits with its partners, less capital (dollars reserves of the countries) will flow back into the US seeking some minimum return in the form of interest on fascist state treasuries. Thus if the fascist state did not borrow the excess capital within the world market, the capital would immediately be devalued. The problem is not that Washington accumulates debt by borrowing the excess capital; the real calamity sets in once Washington stop borrowing it."
The internal logic of capitalism contains within it a number of contradictions that give rise to imbalances and crises which ripple throughout the system, affecting the bottom line of capitalists and the social life of producers alike. And when both the mass of superfluous (i.e., unproductive) capital and labour increase in conjunction with efficiencies in production due to these contradictions, they cause the rate of profit to fall and a shrinkage in the absolute mass of profit created (essentially halting the circulation of capital), compelling capitalists to find ways to overcome this, whether through encouraging debt spending, the opening of new markets, the 'creative destruction' of superfluous capital (mostly through state consumption), or creating ways to increase the mass of profit that via evolutions (i.e., innovations) in the means of production and finance that, in turn, set up the conditions for further overaccumulation and crises.
Another reason state intervention (particular in the form of deficit spending) is needed is that a drastic drop in the total hours of labour via unemployment, reduced hours, etc. drastically reduces the time available to capitalists for production of surplus value, which is another material force pushing capital to not only accept and even welcome intervention, but making it a necessity for capitalism to continue to function. Thus intervention not only helps to keep unemployment low and extend the total hours of labour, but it consumes unproductive capital that would otherwise stall the system, which is why Jehu argues that, "The capital that is lent to Washington must be lent to it, because it cannot be employed productively and can only accrue profit in the form of interest payments on fictitious state debts" and "Even as deficit spending increases, austerity and longer hours of labor must be imposed on the working class."
Despite romantic, liberal notions to the contrary, the state is first and foremost the material expression of capitalist class interests, and from the perspective of labour theory, I think this, plus the material conditions mentioned above, tend to affect and ultimately direct both domestic and foreign economic policies (including the actions of the FED) far more than political ideologies despite how these issues are often framed by the media or politicians. And this, in my opinion, goes a long way towards explaining, among other things, Washington's growing role as national capitalist a la Friedrich Engels in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific—and here I'm thinking specifically about Jehu's analysis of Washington's increasing role as manager of the national capital/surplus absorber on a global scale.
Furthermore, if his analysis is correct, as I believe it is, the greater the reduction of government spending, the greater the potential calamity since "the issue of treasuries is not in the least determined by their 'value,' but by the mass of excess capital that must find any available outlet to expand itself. Even if Washington should want to reduce its deficits, it could do this only by bringing down the entire mode of production. The issue of treasuries is not determined by the needs or spending priorities of the fascist state but by the need of the mode of production. As the MMT school is fond of pointing out, the excess surplus value of capital must take the form of state debt on pain of catastrophe. The biggest myth in the debt ceiling debate from last year is the idea Washington has control over its debt and can determine its expansion."
There's a silver lining to all of this, however. If we except the arguments of Engels and Jehu, then Washington's ever-growing role in managing the productive forces of society signals that the productive forces of society are developed enough, and the social nature of production pervasive enough, for the socialized character of the means of production to be given "complete freedom to work itself out," meaning a possible end to wage labour and the beginning of a new historical epoch. So while free-market advocates and laissez-faire economists continue to argue against the evils of state intervention, what they may ironically be arguing for is the acceleration of capitalism's demise.
As the blogger Jehu argues (correctly, in my opinion) via Twitter, "Fascist state deficit spending is drawn from the mass of superfluous capital loaned to it from both within the US and abroad [here fascism = the assumption by the state of the functions of the capitalist class]. Most of the discussion concerning this deficit spending focuses on the ability of the US to fund its deficits, but this is not the problem. So long as the excess capital accumulates within the world market, this capital must find its way into US treasuries. The alternative is that it sits idle and will sooner or later suffer massive nominal devaluation. This excess capital cannot be employed as capital and would, in the absence of Washington's debts, simply fall out of circulation. In such a case there would be a crisis of overaccumulation along the lines described by Marx in Capital, Volume 3, chapter 15."
In other words, the state intervenes because it must, not because of any ideological considerations. The latter may influence or shape said intervention, but it's not the primary cause of it—the contradictions inherent within the capitalist mode of production are. Otherwise, "Side by side with the mass of excess capital, there would also appear a massive population of unemployed workers, who are utterly cut off from productive employment. Assuming the more conservative figures of unproductive labor time provided by Borsch-Supan are correct, this amounts to anywhere from 10% to 30% of the working class. Using the most conservative numbers offered by labor theorists, unemployment could easily reach 50%."
Socially, this level of unemployment would lead to a situation similar to that of the Great Depression worldwide, with all the social unrest and subsequent labour militancy. But as Jehu argues, this unemployment is only the tip of the 'cliche iceberg': "Absent US deficits, overaccumulation would produce a classical depression of the falling rate of profit. Fifty percent of nominal economic activity would evaporate; in turn, competition would erupt among capital to avoid losses; the financial sector would implode; prices would collapse; industrial activity would halt; and the credit system would shut down. The effects would not simply be limited to the US, but would spread throughout the world market; in first place because the depression would severely restrict US imports from the rest of the world market. The largest trading partners of the US would suffer knock-on effects of the collapse of US demands for their output. Moreover, since the crisis in the US forcibly devalues commodity prices there, these commodities will become competitive against former US competitors, adding the deflationary pressures in those countries."
He concludes that, "With the fall off in US trade deficits with its partners, less capital (dollars reserves of the countries) will flow back into the US seeking some minimum return in the form of interest on fascist state treasuries. Thus if the fascist state did not borrow the excess capital within the world market, the capital would immediately be devalued. The problem is not that Washington accumulates debt by borrowing the excess capital; the real calamity sets in once Washington stop borrowing it."
The internal logic of capitalism contains within it a number of contradictions that give rise to imbalances and crises which ripple throughout the system, affecting the bottom line of capitalists and the social life of producers alike. And when both the mass of superfluous (i.e., unproductive) capital and labour increase in conjunction with efficiencies in production due to these contradictions, they cause the rate of profit to fall and a shrinkage in the absolute mass of profit created (essentially halting the circulation of capital), compelling capitalists to find ways to overcome this, whether through encouraging debt spending, the opening of new markets, the 'creative destruction' of superfluous capital (mostly through state consumption), or creating ways to increase the mass of profit that via evolutions (i.e., innovations) in the means of production and finance that, in turn, set up the conditions for further overaccumulation and crises.
Another reason state intervention (particular in the form of deficit spending) is needed is that a drastic drop in the total hours of labour via unemployment, reduced hours, etc. drastically reduces the time available to capitalists for production of surplus value, which is another material force pushing capital to not only accept and even welcome intervention, but making it a necessity for capitalism to continue to function. Thus intervention not only helps to keep unemployment low and extend the total hours of labour, but it consumes unproductive capital that would otherwise stall the system, which is why Jehu argues that, "The capital that is lent to Washington must be lent to it, because it cannot be employed productively and can only accrue profit in the form of interest payments on fictitious state debts" and "Even as deficit spending increases, austerity and longer hours of labor must be imposed on the working class."
Despite romantic, liberal notions to the contrary, the state is first and foremost the material expression of capitalist class interests, and from the perspective of labour theory, I think this, plus the material conditions mentioned above, tend to affect and ultimately direct both domestic and foreign economic policies (including the actions of the FED) far more than political ideologies despite how these issues are often framed by the media or politicians. And this, in my opinion, goes a long way towards explaining, among other things, Washington's growing role as national capitalist a la Friedrich Engels in Socialism: Utopian and Scientific—and here I'm thinking specifically about Jehu's analysis of Washington's increasing role as manager of the national capital/surplus absorber on a global scale.
Furthermore, if his analysis is correct, as I believe it is, the greater the reduction of government spending, the greater the potential calamity since "the issue of treasuries is not in the least determined by their 'value,' but by the mass of excess capital that must find any available outlet to expand itself. Even if Washington should want to reduce its deficits, it could do this only by bringing down the entire mode of production. The issue of treasuries is not determined by the needs or spending priorities of the fascist state but by the need of the mode of production. As the MMT school is fond of pointing out, the excess surplus value of capital must take the form of state debt on pain of catastrophe. The biggest myth in the debt ceiling debate from last year is the idea Washington has control over its debt and can determine its expansion."
There's a silver lining to all of this, however. If we except the arguments of Engels and Jehu, then Washington's ever-growing role in managing the productive forces of society signals that the productive forces of society are developed enough, and the social nature of production pervasive enough, for the socialized character of the means of production to be given "complete freedom to work itself out," meaning a possible end to wage labour and the beginning of a new historical epoch. So while free-market advocates and laissez-faire economists continue to argue against the evils of state intervention, what they may ironically be arguing for is the acceleration of capitalism's demise.
Tuesday, February 25, 2014
your ancestors, your fate or social-darwinism is the scientific equivalent to the myth of the american dream
From the New York Times:
Your Ancestors, Your Fate
One the one hand, I think this it's an interesting study of social mobility that counters the myth of the easily obtainable 'American Dream.' In my opinion, the ideology of social mobility inherent in the myth of the American Dream is something that's been used to pacify those experiencing socio-economic inequality and vindicate those on the opposite end of the spectrum, by framing the narrative of social and economic inequality in terms of personal failings, i.e., the idea that, if you're not successful, it's because you didn't try hard enough, you didn't work hard enough, you didn't work smart enough, etc. because we all have an equal chance of becoming successful in a capitalist society. The most salient paragraph is:
That said, I strongly disagree with the Social-Darwinian conclusion of Gregory Clark that, "In modern meritocratic societies, success still depends on individual effort. Our findings suggest, however, that the compulsion to strive, the talent to prosper and the ability to overcome failure are strongly inherited. We can’t know for certain what the mechanism of that inheritance is, though we know that genetics plays a surprisingly strong role."
For one, I think that it ignores the incestousness of the ruling class in any society. Even when things like heredity aristocracy are no longer vogue, ruling elites tend to remain a social class brought together (albeit loosely) by their material class interests, which mainly revolve around the ownership of property and material wealth that directly or indirectly gives them access to political power. And while Clark tries to suggest that's not really a factor in determining the statistical success of children born within that class, I think he fails to do so conclusively. The reality is that there are a number of fairly well-documented socio-economic advantages for those of more privileged backgrounds, as well as barriers for those at the bottom of the social ladder.
It also ignores that the aid given to the poor isn't comparable to the wealth and other material advantages of elites. Clark argues, for example, that, "The societies that invest the most in helping disadvantaged children, like the Nordic countries, have produced absolute, commendable benefits for these children, but they have not changed their relative social position." But this is a vulgar and superficial comparison, in my opinion, that disregards a host of other factors that go into social status and relations in capitalist society (and all the countries mentioned are capitalistic in some shape or form).
I think a more compelling comparison in this instance would be between poorer children in countries who receive the most help and those in countries who receive little to none, rather than between poorer children get food stamps and possibly a decent education if they're lucky and wealthy children who general start out with more and have to do less to get the same opportunities. Is it really all that surprising that a poor kid on food stamps living in a poor neighborhood with likely higher crime rates and shittier schools won't statistically do as well as a kid from a wealthier family, who probably lives in a nicer neighborhood and goes to a better and less crowded school? It's mainly just a genetic thing?
Another thing that troubles me is that Clark notes a "number of studies of adopted children in the United States and Nordic countries show convincingly that their life chances are more strongly predicted from their biological parents than their adoptive families," but he doesn't put those statistics into any kind of context, i.e., there's no evidence supporting that this statistic in and of itself points to predominately genetic factors rather than a complex array of genetic, cultural, socio-economic, etc. factors. It assumes all things being equal when in fact they're not, or at least aren't shown to be.
Here, I think a comparison of children from 'higher-status' families raised by 'lower-status' families and vice-versa is needed to help rule out the influence other socio-economic factors before we can comfortable conclude that it's all in the genes. Do children adopted by higher-status families perform worse than biological children of higher-status families, for example? Do children adopted by lower-status families perform better than biological children of lower-status families? The data's most likely available, but I'm skeptical that it'd show a statistically significant difference (which could possibly be why Clark ignores it).
While I think the study of social mobility is interesting, I think Clark draws incredibly broad conclusions from cherry-picked and 'noisy' data, especially after noting the difficulties of quantitatively studying the issue. In my opinion, the advantages of familial socio-economic resources (including early childhood nutrition, which is important for brain development), social networks, etc., not to mention other environmental factors like what neighborhood one grows up in and the kinds of peers one grows up with, etc., are basically written off by Clark, and genetics given centre stage for what I suspect to be more ideological reasons rather than purely scientific ones. It's the scientific equivalent of the myth of the American Dream.
Your Ancestors, Your Fate
One the one hand, I think this it's an interesting study of social mobility that counters the myth of the easily obtainable 'American Dream.' In my opinion, the ideology of social mobility inherent in the myth of the American Dream is something that's been used to pacify those experiencing socio-economic inequality and vindicate those on the opposite end of the spectrum, by framing the narrative of social and economic inequality in terms of personal failings, i.e., the idea that, if you're not successful, it's because you didn't try hard enough, you didn't work hard enough, you didn't work smart enough, etc. because we all have an equal chance of becoming successful in a capitalist society. The most salient paragraph is:
To a striking extent, your overall life chances can be predicted not just from your parents’ status but also from your great-great-great-grandparents’. The recent study suggests that 10 percent of variation in income can be predicted based on your parents’ earnings. In contrast, my colleagues and I estimate that 50 to 60 percent of variation in overall status is determined by your lineage. The fortunes of high-status families inexorably fall, and those of low-status families rise, toward the average — what social scientists call “regression to the mean” — but the process can take 10 to 15 generations (300 to 450 years), much longer than most social scientists have estimated in the past.
That said, I strongly disagree with the Social-Darwinian conclusion of Gregory Clark that, "In modern meritocratic societies, success still depends on individual effort. Our findings suggest, however, that the compulsion to strive, the talent to prosper and the ability to overcome failure are strongly inherited. We can’t know for certain what the mechanism of that inheritance is, though we know that genetics plays a surprisingly strong role."
For one, I think that it ignores the incestousness of the ruling class in any society. Even when things like heredity aristocracy are no longer vogue, ruling elites tend to remain a social class brought together (albeit loosely) by their material class interests, which mainly revolve around the ownership of property and material wealth that directly or indirectly gives them access to political power. And while Clark tries to suggest that's not really a factor in determining the statistical success of children born within that class, I think he fails to do so conclusively. The reality is that there are a number of fairly well-documented socio-economic advantages for those of more privileged backgrounds, as well as barriers for those at the bottom of the social ladder.
It also ignores that the aid given to the poor isn't comparable to the wealth and other material advantages of elites. Clark argues, for example, that, "The societies that invest the most in helping disadvantaged children, like the Nordic countries, have produced absolute, commendable benefits for these children, but they have not changed their relative social position." But this is a vulgar and superficial comparison, in my opinion, that disregards a host of other factors that go into social status and relations in capitalist society (and all the countries mentioned are capitalistic in some shape or form).
I think a more compelling comparison in this instance would be between poorer children in countries who receive the most help and those in countries who receive little to none, rather than between poorer children get food stamps and possibly a decent education if they're lucky and wealthy children who general start out with more and have to do less to get the same opportunities. Is it really all that surprising that a poor kid on food stamps living in a poor neighborhood with likely higher crime rates and shittier schools won't statistically do as well as a kid from a wealthier family, who probably lives in a nicer neighborhood and goes to a better and less crowded school? It's mainly just a genetic thing?
Another thing that troubles me is that Clark notes a "number of studies of adopted children in the United States and Nordic countries show convincingly that their life chances are more strongly predicted from their biological parents than their adoptive families," but he doesn't put those statistics into any kind of context, i.e., there's no evidence supporting that this statistic in and of itself points to predominately genetic factors rather than a complex array of genetic, cultural, socio-economic, etc. factors. It assumes all things being equal when in fact they're not, or at least aren't shown to be.
Here, I think a comparison of children from 'higher-status' families raised by 'lower-status' families and vice-versa is needed to help rule out the influence other socio-economic factors before we can comfortable conclude that it's all in the genes. Do children adopted by higher-status families perform worse than biological children of higher-status families, for example? Do children adopted by lower-status families perform better than biological children of lower-status families? The data's most likely available, but I'm skeptical that it'd show a statistically significant difference (which could possibly be why Clark ignores it).
While I think the study of social mobility is interesting, I think Clark draws incredibly broad conclusions from cherry-picked and 'noisy' data, especially after noting the difficulties of quantitatively studying the issue. In my opinion, the advantages of familial socio-economic resources (including early childhood nutrition, which is important for brain development), social networks, etc., not to mention other environmental factors like what neighborhood one grows up in and the kinds of peers one grows up with, etc., are basically written off by Clark, and genetics given centre stage for what I suspect to be more ideological reasons rather than purely scientific ones. It's the scientific equivalent of the myth of the American Dream.
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